Ethan Jerzak’s Paradoxical Desires argues that some possible combinations of desires create a Liar-style paradox at the level of thought itself. The paper’s central lesson is that classical logic, not merely language or truth-talk, may need revision to handle paradoxical propositional attitudes.
What is Paradoxical Desires about?
Paradoxical Desires presents a paradox built from ordinary-looking desires. Jerzak argues that if people can want things about other people’s desires, then some desire profiles can generate contradictions similar to the Liar paradox.
TL;DR: The paper asks whether a paradox can arise from what people want, not merely from what sentences say.
- Main topic: paradoxical propositional attitudes, especially desire.
- Core example: Mal wants Ben’s strongest desire to be frustrated; Ben wants Mal’s strongest desire to be satisfied.
- Central conclusion: the best response is a non-classical account on which some desires are neither determinately satisfied nor determinately unsatisfied.
What is the Mal/Ben desire paradox?
The Mal/Ben case creates a circular dependency between two strongest desires. Mal’s strongest desire is satisfied if and only if Ben’s strongest desire is not satisfied; Ben’s strongest desire is satisfied if and only if Mal’s strongest desire is satisfied.
TL;DR: Mal succeeds exactly when Ben fails, while Ben succeeds exactly when Mal succeeds. Classical reasoning then makes each option collapse into contradiction.
| Person | Strongest desire | Satisfaction condition |
|---|---|---|
| Mal | Ben does not get whatever Ben most strongly desires. | Mal’s desire is satisfied if Ben’s strongest desire is frustrated. |
| Ben | Mal gets whatever Mal most strongly desires. | Ben’s desire is satisfied if Mal’s strongest desire is satisfied. |
The paradox is not that Mal or Ben has an internally inconsistent desire. Each desire could be satisfied in another setting. The contradiction arises from the relation between the two desires when they are held together.
What trilemma does the paradox create?
Jerzak argues that the desire paradox forces a difficult choice. We can deny that the case is possible, reject intuitive principles connecting desires to their satisfaction conditions, or revise classical logic.
TL;DR: The paper rejects the first two options and favors the third: a non-classical treatment of paradoxical desires.
| Response | What it says | Why Jerzak resists it |
|---|---|---|
| Deny the case | Mal and Ben cannot really have those desires together. | This imposes surprising restrictions on what people can desire and lacks an independent theory of why those restrictions hold. |
| Deny desire-satisfaction principles | A strongest desire for p need not be satisfied exactly when p obtains. | The strongest-desire version of the satisfaction principle is highly plausible, and rejecting it risks revenge versions of the paradox. |
| Revise logic | Some classical inference patterns fail in paradoxical settings. | This lets the theory preserve the desire-satisfaction link while explaining the desire paradox and the Liar paradox in a unified way. |
Why not deny that Mal and Ben’s desires are possible?
Denying the case requires a theory of mental content that forbids desire-directed desires in the right circumstances. Jerzak argues that this is hard to motivate because people routinely have desires about what others want, and both language-like and pragmatic theories of mental content can explain those desires.
TL;DR: The desires look psychologically possible. The problem is not that Mal and Ben cannot think or want these things; the problem is that classical logic cannot comfortably evaluate their satisfaction together.
- Intrinsic denial: says no one can have desires of this form at all. Jerzak treats this as too restrictive.
- Relational denial: says each desire is possible alone, but not together. Jerzak argues that this creates an implausibly radical form of content externalism.
- Preferred diagnosis: accept the desire profile as possible, then locate the failure in the reasoning that demands a classical satisfaction value.
Why not deny desire-satisfaction principles?
Jerzak distinguishes a broad desire-satisfaction schema from a stronger principle about strongest desires. The broad version may face complications, but the strongest-desire version is harder to reject: if someone most strongly desires that p, then that strongest desire seems satisfied if and only if p.
TL;DR: Rejecting the strongest-desire satisfaction principle saves classical logic only by giving up a very natural link between what someone most wants and whether they get it.
Strongest Desire Satisfaction Schema: if a subject most strongly desires that p, then that subject’s strongest desire is satisfied if and only if p.
In the Mal/Ben case, this principle yields the paradox-generating biconditionals: Mal’s desire is satisfied if and only if Ben’s is not, and Ben’s desire is satisfied if and only if Mal’s is.
How does the non-classical solution work?
On the non-classical approach Jerzak favors, the question “Does Mal get what she wants?” has no determinate classical answer in the paradoxical case. Mal’s desire is neither determinately satisfied nor determinately unsatisfied, and the same pattern applies to Ben.
TL;DR: The non-classical solution keeps the satisfaction principles but blocks the inference from circular biconditionals to explosive contradiction.
- What becomes indeterminate: whether Mal or Ben gets what they most strongly desire.
- What remains true: the structural links between the desires: Mal succeeds iff Ben fails; Ben succeeds iff Mal succeeds.
- What changes logically: some classical rules for suppositional reasoning, especially negation-introduction and conditional-introduction, no longer apply unrestrictedly.
- Why this matters: one logical adjustment can handle both the desire paradox and familiar semantic paradoxes.
Why does Paradoxical Desires matter?
The paper matters because it challenges a common diagnosis of semantic paradoxes. If a Liar-style paradox can arise from desires rather than truth predicates, then paradox is not merely a problem caused by expressive language.
TL;DR: Jerzak’s argument pushes theories of paradox beyond language and into the structure of thought, mental content, and propositional attitudes.
For philosophy of logic
The paper gives a new reason to consider non-classical logic: it solves structurally similar paradoxes in a single way instead of treating truth and desire separately.
For philosophy of mind
The paper argues that theories of mental content should allow desire-involving desires, even when those desires create paradoxical satisfaction conditions.
For semantic paradoxes
The paper weakens the view that paradoxes such as the Liar arise only because language contains a powerful truth predicate.
FAQ about Paradoxical Desires
What is the main argument of Paradoxical Desires?
The main argument is that possible desire profiles can create Liar-style paradoxes. Because denying the desires and rejecting strongest-desire satisfaction principles are both costly, Jerzak argues that a non-classical approach is the best response.
What is the Mal/Ben paradox?
Mal most strongly wants Ben’s strongest desire to be frustrated. Ben most strongly wants Mal’s strongest desire to be satisfied. If Mal succeeds, Ben fails; but if Ben fails, Mal cannot succeed. If Mal fails, Ben succeeds; but if Ben succeeds, Mal succeeds. Classical evaluation gives no stable answer.
Is this just the Liar paradox in different words?
No. The structure resembles the Liar paradox, but the subject matter is different. The Liar paradox concerns truth and sentences; the desire paradox concerns whether mental states are satisfied.
What does “non-classical” mean here?
“Non-classical” means that some standard rules of classical logic are restricted or revised. In Jerzak’s favored paracomplete direction, some propositions fall into a truth-value gap rather than being determinately true or determinately false.
What is the paper’s broader contribution?
The paper argues that paradoxes can arise at the level of thought, not only at the level of language. This gives philosophers a reason to prefer solutions that handle semantic and non-semantic paradoxes together.